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67 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA9  
10 JANVIER VILLARS,  
11 Plaintiff,  
12 v.  
13 PAM BONDI, et al.,  
14 Defendants.

Case No. 25-cv-04239-RS

**ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR  
RECUSAL AND RECONSIDERATION**15 Plaintiff demands things—en banc review by the full bench of this district, a trial by a  
16 “blockchain jury,” “automatic equitable relief”—that simply do not exist. For the following  
17 reasons, his motion seeking recusal of this Court and reconsideration of the order dismissing his  
18 complaint without prejudice is denied.19 **I. Recusal and Disqualification**20 Plaintiff’s demand for recusal falls short of the standard requiring referral to another  
21 judge. His arguments are based on disagreement with this Court’s previous rulings and his  
22 assertions of widespread fraud throughout the judiciary. The standard for recusal is “whether a  
23 reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality  
24 might reasonably be questioned.” *Mayes v. Leipziger*, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting  
25 *United States v. Nelson*, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir.1983)); *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 144. Such  
26 prejudice must result from an extrajudicial source. *See id.* Accordingly, a previous adverse ruling  
27 is not grounds for recusal. *Id.* Plaintiff’s additional allegations that this Court is biased by its own  
28 interest in concealing “judicial fraud” do not fare any better. In fact, such allegations, taken as

1 true, would seem to disqualify the entire federal judiciary. Plaintiff's request for recusal and  
2 reassignment to another judge or a panel of judges is therefore bewildering as well as legally  
3 insufficient.

4 Plaintiff's motion to disqualify this Court under Title 28 § 455 is similarly deficient. This  
5 portion of his motion relies on the same unsubstantiated accusations of widespread fraud. The  
6 standard for disqualification under § 455(a) is the same as for voluntary recusal under § 144. *See*  
7 *Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Ct.*, 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005) (“whether a reasonable person with  
8 knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be  
9 questioned”). The “reasonable person” is not someone who is “hypersensitive or unduly  
10 suspicious,” but rather is a “well-informed, thoughtful observer.” *United States v. Holland*, 519  
11 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Importantly, the standard is not met by “the  
12 merest unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice.” *Id.* Plaintiff's allegations, where  
13 comprehensible, are based on this Court's previous adverse decisions and inchoate accusations of  
14 fraud. These arguments do not undermine this Court's impartiality in the eyes of a reasonable  
15 person. *See id.*

## 16 II. Reconsideration

17 Parties in this district must seek leave to file a motion for reconsideration. Civ. L.R. 7-9(a).  
18 That said, Plaintiff's motion will not be denied for this procedural defect. It is denied for lack of  
19 merit. Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy and should not be granted “absent highly  
20 unusual circumstances.” *Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co.*, 571 F.3d  
21 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Assuming leave is properly sought and granted, a party  
22 may prevail on a motion for reconsideration by demonstrating at least one of the following: (1)  
23 “[A] material difference in fact or law exists from that which was presented to the Court before  
24 entry of the interlocutory order for which reconsideration is sought”; (2) “The emergence of new  
25 material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such order”; or (3) “A manifest failure  
26 by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the  
27 Court before such interlocutory order.” Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). Plaintiff presents none of those

1 circumstances here. Plaintiff's legal and factual assertions are identical to those raised in his  
2 Complaint and slew of motions. These arguments were duly considered by this Court and found to  
3 be unsupported by anything in the record or in Plaintiff's citations to caselaw. Plaintiff believes he  
4 is entitled to further proceedings on his original complaint solely because he disagrees with the  
5 Court's dismissal. However, this opinion is not grounds for reconsideration.

6 Reconsideration is particularly inappropriate where leave to amend was granted. Plaintiff  
7 may still file an amended complaint. Otherwise, he should seek any further relief via appeal to the  
8 circuit court. Plaintiff's motion is denied.

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10 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

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12 Dated: August 1, 2025



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14 RICHARD SEEBORG  
15 Chief United States District Judge

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United States District Court  
Northern District of California